On 5 March 2026, the Azerbaijani authorities reported that Iran’s armed forces had attacked several sites using four unmanned aerial vehicles, leaving two people injured. In response, President Ilham Aliyev convened a meeting of the Security Council, stating that Iran had carried out a terrorist act against Azerbaijan. All of the country’s security structures were mobilised, and preparations for possible operations were launched.

The following day, Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov announced the decision to evacuate all diplomatic personnel from Iran. Azerbaijan’s State Security Service released a video detailing the alleged uncovering of preparations for a terrorist attack by agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. According to the video, the targets of the planned attack were strategic facilities: the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline, the Israeli embassy, and a Jewish synagogue. Another alleged target was the physical elimination of one of the leaders of the Mountain Jewish community. In the footage, security services showed the detention of eight Azerbaijani citizens accused of links with the IRGC and involvement in preparing the attack.

Official Tehran, in turn, stated that it had always respected Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and accused Israel and the United States of organising the incident, denying any responsibility. Iranian officials characterised the situation as a matter of foreign policy manipulation.

The sharp tone of the statements of the Ilham Aliyev regime, the swift actions of security structures, and the choice of demonstrative targets may indicate a carefully planned information campaign aimed at mobilising the domestic audience and preparing for a possible escalation.

In a broader geopolitical context, Azerbaijan maintains close strategic ties with Israel and the United States, including military-technical cooperation, while the countries are energy-interdependent. Israel remains one of Azerbaijan’s main suppliers of weapons, while Azerbaijan provides a significant share of Israel’s oil needs. The United States acts as the principal political and military guarantor of these relations.

The synchronicity of actions by the Aliyev regime and the selection of strategic targets affecting Israeli interests may be interpreted as a political signal. The drone incident appears to have been planned in advance: it would be impossible within a single day to uncover all the facts, film them, and produce an informative video report. This information campaign helps shape the perception of a threat from Iran and creates political justification for possible escalation.

Although formally a Shiite state, Azerbaijan has become a key anti-Iranian outpost in the region, closely fulfilling its commitments to Washington and Tel Aviv.

Taken together, the circumstances give the impression that the drone incident may have been artificially constructed and carefully orchestrated for political manipulation. It could be used as a pretext to involve Baku in a serious confrontation with Tehran and potentially deploy the armed forces of Shiite Azerbaijan against Shiite Iran as part of a ground operation. Such a strategy could quickly transform a local crisis into a full-scale regional confrontation, destabilising not only the South Caucasus but the entire Central Asia region.

According to Israeli media reports citing military sources, the possibility of Azerbaijan’s direct involvement in a military clash with Iran is already being discussed.

Given the strategic alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey, reinforced by the Shusha Declaration, which includes commitments to protect Nakhchivan, Baku’s entry into any anti-Iranian coalition could trigger a “domino effect” within the Organisation of Turkic States. This would mean transforming the organisation from a cultural-humanitarian association into a full-fledged military-political alliance.

The reactions of Tashkent and Astana, which unequivocally supported Aliyev’s government and strongly condemned Iran’s alleged attacks on Azerbaijan on 5 March, as well as direct consultations between the foreign ministers of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with their Azerbaijani and Turkish counterparts, confirm this transformation. Considering Israel’s long-term strategies under the Abraham Accords, in which Tashkent and Astana are assigned a special role, as well as the continuing influence of the United States in the region, the likelihood of forming a unified Turkic front in a potential conflict with Iran is shifting from a theoretical risk to the realm of real military planning.

If Mirziyoyev were, for any reason, to attempt to distance itself from participation in an anti-Iranian military coalition, the “directors of the Great Game” would likely resort to strong coercive measures. The main instruments of pressure would be cross-border projects capable of radically altering the balance of power in the region, such as the Qosh Tepa Canal and the “Sea Breeze Uzbekistan” project. These initiatives go beyond economic effects; they act as strategic levers of control over key resources and infrastructure, enabling external influence.

The involvement of structures closely linked to the Aliyev regime in the implementation of entertainment and logistics projects in Uzbekistan goes far beyond the usual business. Their rapid implementation indicates an intention to entrench themselves at strategically important points in Uzbekistan, creating opportunities to manipulate water resources and logistics at the very heart of the republic. These projects serve as preparation for long-term external influence aimed at strengthening and preserving ties with the Aliyev regime through key figures such as Emin Agalarov.

At the same time, the main catalyst for Uzbekistan’s potential vulnerability remains the internal weakness of the regime of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. A lack of competence and professionalism within the vertical structure of power, as well as limited strategic thinking, creates fertile ground for the implementation of external scenarios. Deeply entrenched corruption further increases the country’s vulnerability to manipulation and external control.

Vital resources such as water and land are becoming instruments of external pressure, depriving Uzbekistan of the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy. The Qosh Tepa Canal and the “Sea Breeze Uzbekistan” project are turning into strategic levers of influence capable of provoking water and territorial conflicts with neighbours and transforming Central Asia into a zone of constant tension and potential military instability.

Ignoring the country’s long-term interests for the sake of short-term gains leads to destabilisation comparable to the Syrian scenario. Against the backdrop of overpopulation and acute socio-political problems, the scale of potential destruction and human losses could exceed those seen in the wars of the Middle East.

The Mirziyoyev regime, blinded by short-term gains from foreign investment and the outward glitter of international attention, is effectively signing a verdict against national security. Such a course risks turning Uzbekistan into a testing ground for external geopolitical experiments, placing the future of the country and its people in jeopardy.