Power Struggle: Saida Mirziyoyeva vs. the State Security Service

06.04.2026 admin

For the second consecutive year, the regime of Shavkat Mirziyoyev has been carrying out a systematic purge of the information space, targeting the resources of the “Erkin O’zbekiston” movement. Through mechanisms of transnational repression, the authorities are attempting to eliminate any content that exposes their alleged crimes.

Thus, on 24 February of this year, the YouTube platform sent two notifications to the “Erkin O’zbekiston” channel alleging violations of privacy. The complaints concerned videos published in the spring of 2025, which reported on alleged abuses by Uzbekistan’s security services and the embezzlement of defence budget funds.

A well-argued appeal made it possible to keep the videos online; however, the attempt to remove them has once again brought attention back to this issue.

A Monopoly over Billions: How the Defence Budget Is Being Embezzled

In January 2023, a state unitary enterprise, “OÊ»ztextreyd“, was established in Uzbekistan and granted full control over defence procurement.

Formally, this was intended to ensure centralisation and efficiency. In reality, it concentrated financial flows in a single set of hands.

By decision of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Khotamjon Yusupov—who had previously held senior positions within Uzbekistan’s defence industry—was appointed as its head. The company was granted the status of exclusive importer of military and dual-use goods, with an annual procurement volume of approximately $5 billion.

From that moment on, the entire procurement system became closed. Oversight by relevant state bodies—even military counter-intelligence—effectively disappeared.

Instead of transparent procedures, a closed scheme emerged: funds were now distributed within a narrow circle of individuals, without any oversight.

Against this backdrop, a state commission on military procurement was established, headed by the country’s top leadership — President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, and Security Council Secretary Viktor Makhmudov. They were responsible for making all final decisions regarding procurement.

At the same time, a working group was created under the leadership of the Minister of Defence, directly overseeing the entire supply chain of military and dual-use products from abroad.

Real control over the system was concentrated in groups linked to Abdulla Aripov, Batyr Tursunov, and Otabek Umarov, who are described as integral parts of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s governing structure.

Within this arrangement, the state enterprise “OÊ»ztextreyd” effectively turned into a “laundering mechanism” for budget funds. Its director, Khotamjon Yusupov, acted as a trusted intermediary between the state and suppliers, facilitating the concealment and laundering of misappropriated funds and turning corruption schemes into a well-established system.

In particular, this involved the procurement of equipment and related goods at heavily inflated prices while deliberately lowering technical specifications. A notable example is the purchase of Embraer C-390 Millennium military transport aircraft at clearly inflated prices.

This decision was actively lobbied by Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and the current head of the State Security Service, Bakhodir Kurbanov.

A similar scheme was used in a contract for the supply of 20 Chinese fighter jets — an evidently unfavourable deal that benefited Aripov and Kurbanov but harmed Uzbekistan’s budget and national security.

Under the pretext of “counter-terrorism”, Abdulla Aripov initiated the procurement and installation of Chinese surveillance systems that are said to contradict the Constitution of Uzbekistan. The key risk of these technologies lies in the fact that the manufacturer retains full remote access to all cameras and control points. In effect, control over critical infrastructure in Uzbekistan has been placed in foreign hands.

A similar scheme was used in the procurement of expensive armoured vehicles from domestic manufacturers. The technical specifications of the supplied equipment reportedly rendered it unsuitable for both combat and civilian use, while the cost of the contracts was inflated several times over—up to five times their real value.

The promotion of these allegedly ineffective deals was actively carried out by Otabek Umarov, the younger son-in-law of President Mirziyoyev.

The tandem of First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Service Batyr Tursunov and Secretary of the Security Council under the President of Uzbekistan Viktor Makhmudov has long gone beyond ordinary corruption. Their actions are described as directly undermining the country’s sovereignty.

Under the guise of a policy of “openness”, they reportedly registered official electronic contacts of senior security officials on Russian public services such as Mail.ru. As a result, Russian intelligence services allegedly gained full access to Uzbekistan’s correspondence and strategic data.

This “digital subversion” was not accidental: the actions of high-ranking officials are described as deliberately undermining state institutions. Through their channels, sensitive information intended to strengthen national defence was allegedly leaked directly to foreign handlers.

Moreover, Batyr Tursunov is accused of patronising the drug trade, turning law enforcement agencies into instruments for protecting illegal narcotics trafficking. As a result, the level of drug dependency among security personnel has reportedly reached a critically high level, undermining discipline, command capability, and the operational readiness of the army and law enforcement bodies.

Taken together with corruption, leaks of strategic information, and the persecution of honest officials, the actions of senior figures within the security apparatus are creating a genuine state crisis. What some might have taken for isolated mistakes is, in fact, described as deliberate subversive activity—nothing short of espionage.

Exposure and Its Consequences: Punishment for the Truth

The large-scale embezzlement of Uzbekistan’s defence budget became known thanks to the integrity of one individual—Lieutenant Colonel Valijon Rakhmanov of the Military Counter-intelligence Directorate of the State Security Service of the Republic of Uzbekistan. He conducted a detailed investigation, documented corruption, and submitted evidence to the leadership, expecting a lawful response.

However, instead of investigating those responsible for the embezzlement, the State Security Service allegedly launched repressive measures against Rakhmanov himself. In order to conceal the corruption, a case of “high treason” was reportedly fabricated against him—he was accused of spying for the United States and the United Nations.

In February 2024, he was detained, and in January 2025, a Military Court sentenced the lieutenant colonel to 16 years in prison. Three months later, the appeal upheld the verdict—turning an anti-corruption officer into a “traitor to the homeland”.

To deprive him of legal protection, officers of the State Security Service, acting through investigator Lieutenant Colonel Timur Mukhitdinov of the Military Prosecutor’s Office for Special Affairs, secured the disbarment of his defence lawyers, Allan Pashkovsky and Vladimir Nikitin.

The defence was dismantled, and independent legal counsel was removed from the case.

The months-long pressure campaign against lawyer Pashkovsky extended beyond professional sanctions. Systematic pressure from law enforcement authorities reportedly resulted in a personal tragedy: his father’s health deteriorated due to what is described as the unjust treatment of his son, who had devoted many years to serving the country.

On 8 July 2025, he passed away suddenly at the age of 64. This death is presented as a consequence of the repressive policies implemented by the current system.

Continuing to conceal their alleged crimes, officers of the Internal Security Directorate of the State Security Service of the Republic of Uzbekistan once again relied on investigator Mukhitdinov to fabricate a new case against Rakhmanov—this time for the alleged “disclosure of state secrets”. In July 2025, based on what are described as falsified materials, a Military Court handed down an additional sentence of three years’ imprisonment.

When Rakhmanov’s wife, Roxana Rakhmanova, faced the persecution of her husband, she did not remain in the shadows—she began an active campaign. She launched a large-scale media effort, published video appeals to the public, and attempted to break through the information blockade.

However, instead of responding to the alleged wrongdoing, the security services reportedly launched an aggressive counterattack. A discrediting campaign was initiated against Rakhmanova: so-called “troll factories” linked to the security services allegedly organised coordinated online harassment, including threats of violence and warnings of impending criminal prosecution.

In December 2025, simultaneously with the reopening of the case against the director of the state enterprise “OÊ»ztextreyd”, Khotamjon Yusupov—where Rakhmanov was a key witness—the State Security Service initiated a civil lawsuit against him. On the basis of allegedly fabricated documents, the Mirzo-Ulugbek District Court, in closed proceedings and without Rakhmanov’s presence, ordered him to pay 22 million soums in “damages”.

It appears that the process was staged in order to break Rakhmanov and his wife, deprive them of resources for their defence, and draw them into a prolonged and exhausting legal struggle.

At the same time, the political movement “Erkin O’zbekiston”, which had been monitoring Lieutenant Colonel Rakhmanov’s case, faced unprecedented censorship. The organisation’s YouTube channel was blocked twice, while its pages on Facebook and Instagram—including the personal account of Mr. Burkhanov—were removed. These actions are described as reflecting an effort by the authorities to suppress independent voices and conceal alleged abuses. In an atmosphere of fear of persecution, no media outlet was willing to cover Rakhmanov’s case in full.

The State Security Service, Bribes, and Their Vulnerable Proteges

Uzbek security services continue to use officials’ sexual orientation as a tool of blackmail. Under the threat of exposure, they effectively hold the state apparatus hostage, forcing officials to serve the interests of the agency rather than those of the state.

As in the case of the Chairman of the Military Court, Sadriddin Eshonqulov, the agency reportedly uses a compliant investigator, Lieutenant Colonel Timur Mukhitdinov, to pursue individuals it considers undesirable.

Closed hearings completely eliminate public oversight and ensure outcomes favourable to the investigation.

In return for loyal service, the State Security Service is said to turn a blind eye to the “minor indiscretions” of its vulnerable protĂ©gĂ©s—individuals accustomed to keeping aspects of their private lives quieter than publicly acknowledged. Like the entire power vertical of the Mirziyoyev system, the Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Military Court of Uzbekistan are described as deeply entrenched in corruption schemes.

Within the Military Court, there is reportedly a “the bribe boss” a trusted associate of Chairman Sadriddin Bavabekovich Eshonqulov, who officially holds the position of head of the secretariat of the Military Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Intermediaries from the Chamber of Advocates of Uzbekistan, attempting to resolve cases for their wealthy clients who have found themselves in difficult situations, reportedly meet with this “the bribe boss” from the Military Court at a cafĂ© known as “Akmal Oltin Baliq“.

Photo and video materials are said to document one such meeting between the head of the secretariat and lawyers.


Analysis of surveillance camera footage inside and outside this establishment allegedly reveals not only regular meetings but also the transfer of substantial envelopes.

The “the bribe boss” from the Military Court is described as having long carried out her unofficial role—collecting a steady flow of funds from regular clients within the Chamber of Advocates, intended for the Chairman of the Military Court, Sadriddin Bavabekovich Eshonqulov.

Saida Mirziyoyeva vs. the State Security Service

Investigations by the “Erkin O’zbekiston” movement, which exposed alleged corruption schemes involving individuals close to the president, triggered a forced response from the security services in the case concerning embezzlement at the state enterprise “OÊ»ztextreyd”.

In January 2026, the Department for Combating Economic Crimes under the Prosecutor General’s Office of Uzbekistan arrested the company’s director, Khotamjon Yusupov, reopening the investigation. However, the inquiry quickly reached a dead end due to direct interference by high-ranking officials.

Just a month later, the case was hastily removed from its proper jurisdiction. Under strong pressure from the First Deputy Chairman of the State Security Service, Batyr Tursunov, on Prosecutor General Nigmatulla Yuldashev, the case materials were transferred to the Military Prosecutor’s Office under their control. This effectively points to an attempt to conceal evidence of wrongdoing by the ruling elite and to bury the case for a third time.

As a result, the investigation ended up in the hands of a high-profile investigator for special affairs within the Military Prosecutor’s Office, Lieutenant Colonel Timur Mukhitdinov, who is known in certain circles for his lack of constraints.

Given that Uzbekistan’s security services are said to possess compromising material related to Mukhitdinov’s private life, the case—already shelved in 2023 and 2025—risks being closed for a third time unless it generates broad public attention.

Contrary to existing legislation and amid ongoing intra-elite conflicts, the Head of the Presidential Administration, Saida Mirziyoyeva, has moved into an open phase of a power struggle. Her activities extend beyond her formal authority and appear as an assertive attempt to establish herself as the sole successor in Uzbekistan. A dangerous precedent is emerging, in which state institutions are subordinated to the interests of those in power.

The outward gloss of official propaganda cannot conceal the real contradictions within the presidential inner circle. Tight control over the information space and the use of administrative resources have failed to boost the president’s daughter’s public standing. Attempts to portray her as a unifying national figure have fallen short—many perceive her not as a leader but as an opportunistic figure lacking moral credibility.

The prioritisation of personal loyalty over professionalism, along with widespread corruption within Saida Mirziyoyeva’s circle, has led to a series of notable failures and inefficiencies, fuelling public dissatisfaction in Uzbekistan.

Publications by the “Erkin O’zbekiston” movement on 8 January and 3 March 2026 exposed what they describe as a large-scale provocation—a fabricated case concerning an alleged “attempt” on Komil Allamjonov, described as being in a personal relationship with the head of the Presidential Administration.

These revelations reportedly forced those involved into a series of critical missteps.

At the centre of the scandal, Saida Mirziyoyeva was compelled to accelerate events, moving into an open confrontation with the State Security Service. In an attempt to regain control, an aggressive information campaign was launched, reportedly involving “Radio Ozodlik” and commentator Abdurakhmon Tashanov. However, the haste of this campaign led to inconsistencies: security officers detained as early as autumn 2024 were publicly accused of actions they allegedly committed in 2025.

On the night of 25–26 February 2026, during the holy month of Ramadan, Ismoil Jahongirov was brutally killed in a punishment cell at Colony No. 13 in the city of Chirchik. He had been sentenced to 23 years in prison in what is described as a fabricated criminal case concerning an alleged “attempt” on Komil Allamjonov. Direct responsibility for organising this political killing is attributed to the Head of the Presidential Administration, Saida Mirziyoyeva.

By artificially creating and exploiting conflicts between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service, Saida Mirziyoyeva is portrayed as turning inter-agency tensions into a tool of personal influence amid broader destabilisation within the security apparatus. Her alleged objective is to initiate a wave of repression against those security officials who possess incriminating evidence of her personal involvement both in the staging of the “Allamjonov case” and in Jahongirov’s killing. This is described not as the enforcement of law, but as the elimination of witnesses and a pre-emptive strike against security structures aimed at concealing serious state-level crimes.

The confrontation between the Head of the Presidential Administration and the State Security Service has now moved fully into the public sphere. The immediate trigger for escalation was an action by the State Security Service against Tashanov—a pro-government commentator associated with promoting Saida Mirziyoyeva’s public image.

Once again, the same investigator, Mukhitdinov—described as a reliable instrument of the security services—was involved.

Subsequent developments quickly revealed what is described as the staged nature of the events. Under the guise of rhetoric about the “independence” of the judiciary, a public performance unfolded, ending in a predictable outcome: on 1 April of this year, the Mirabad District Criminal Court terminated administrative proceedings against Tashanov due to the absence of an offence.

In conditions where judicial independence is described as effectively absent, such decisions bear no relation to objectivity. Judge Muzaffar Akhmedov, previously noted for issuing politically motivated rulings, is portrayed as unlikely to have acted independently—especially in a case directly involving the interests of the State Security Service. The outcome, it is argued, was determined not in the courtroom through adversarial proceedings, but behind the scenes within the Presidential Administration, where the rule of law ultimately yielded to the dictates of clan-based interests.

The Farce of Security: Who Really Controls Uzbekistan

The situation in the highest levels of power has reached a critical point: clan-based structures within the security apparatus and the president’s inner circle have effectively privatised state institutions. What is meant to serve as a tool for protecting the nation has been transformed into a mechanism for personal enrichment and total control.

A closed meeting held by Shavkat Mirziyoyev on 3 March on issues of military security revealed a striking paradox: the task of modernising the army was entrusted to the very individuals who, for years, had been undermining it from within.

The army and security services have turned into a decorative façade that safeguards not sovereignty, but personal and clan interests. Without a decisive dismantling of entrenched networks, any personel reshuffles amount to little more than political theatre, merely delaying an inevitable collapse.

While slogans about modernisation are voiced at the highest level, a quiet takeover of state functions is unfolding on the ground, where clan loyalty is valued above oath and professionalism.

Unless the rules of the system are urgently reconsidered, the state machinery is likely to fail, leaving the country alone in the face of instability.

Saving Uzbekistan would require a complete dismantling of this entrenched system and a forceful break with clan-based structures; otherwise, the country risks becoming vulnerable to external pressures and being absorbed into broader regional power dynamics.

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